Data access specification and the most powerful symbolic attacker in MSR

  • Authors:
  • Iliano Cervesato

  • Affiliations:
  • Advanced Engineering and Sciences Division, ITT Industries, Inc., Alexandria, VA

  • Venue:
  • ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Most systems designed for the symbolic verification of security protocols operate under the unproved assumption that an attack can only result from the combination of a fixed number of message transformations, which altogether constitute the capabilities of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder. In this paper, we show that the Dolev-Yao intruder can indeed emulate the actions of an arbitrary symbolic adversary. In order to do so, we extend MSR, a flexible specification framework for security protocols based on typed multiset rewriting, with a static check called data access specification and aimed at catching specification errors such as a principal trying to use a key that she is not entitled to access.