A framework for defining logics
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
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Communications of the ACM
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CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Different Look at Secure Distributed Computation
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Efficient Finite-State Analysis for Large Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Optimizing Protocol Rewrite Rules of CIL Specifications
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Reasoning about confidentiality at requirements engineering time
Proceedings of the 10th European software engineering conference held jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation
Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Designing a Secure, Verified, Fair Exchange DRM Scheme
Fundamenta Informaticae - Fundamentals of Software Engineering 2007: Selected Contributions
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Nuovo DRM paradiso: towards a verified fair DRM scheme
FSEN'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Fundamentals of software engineering
Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Designing a Secure, Verified, Fair Exchange DRM Scheme
Fundamenta Informaticae - Fundamentals of Software Engineering 2007: Selected Contributions
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Most systems designed for the symbolic verification of security protocols operate under the unproved assumption that an attack can only result from the combination of a fixed number of message transformations, which altogether constitute the capabilities of the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder. In this paper, we show that the Dolev-Yao intruder can indeed emulate the actions of an arbitrary symbolic adversary. In order to do so, we extend MSR, a flexible specification framework for security protocols based on typed multiset rewriting, with a static check called data access specification and aimed at catching specification errors such as a principal trying to use a key that she is not entitled to access.