Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Trustee-based tracing extensions to anonymous cash and the making of anonymous change
Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Atomicity versus Anonymity: Distributed Transactions for Electronic Commerce
VLDB '98 Proceedings of the 24rd International Conference on Very Large Data Bases
Cooperative vs. Competitive Multi-Agent Negotiations in Retail Electronic Commerce
CIA '98 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents II, Learning, Mobility and Electronic Commerce for Information Discovery on the Internet
RIDE '99 Proceedings of the Ninth International Workshop on Research Issues on Data Engineering: Information Technology for Virtual Enterprises
Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Coalition formation among bounded rational agents
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Markets without Makers - A Framework for Decentralized Economic Coordination in Multiagent Systems
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
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The exchange of goods and services among software agents requires reliable and fair brokering mechanisms to match trading parties and to mediate among their conflicting interests. Available trading models for electronic marketplaces are fixed price selling, bilateral multi-step negotiations, and various forms of auctioning. These models demand trading parties to evaluate appropriate interest matches on their own and encourage them to pretend inexact interests to their advantage. We introduce an arbiter as intermediary that finds buyers and suppliers with best matching interests. The intermediary uses matching and arbitration protocols that ensure better overall benefit than random matches, avoid advantages for agents that manipulate their interests (lies), preserve the mutual privacy of interests of the trading parties, and, if desired, their anonymity. We analyse the protocols with respect to their applicability under various conditions, investigate their robustness with different utility distributions by simulations, and describe which forms of interest manipulations can be avoided.