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An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications
An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications
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CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
A "Paradoxical" Indentity-Based Signature Scheme Resulting from Zero-Knowledge
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Power of fast VLSI models is insensitive to wires' thinness
SFCS '89 Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strong Key-Insulated Signature Schemes
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A survey of key evolving cryptosystems
International Journal of Security and Networks
Construction of Yet Another Forward Secure Signature Scheme Using Bilinear Maps
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Strong mobile device protection from loss and capture
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Identity-based threshold key-insulated encryption without random oracles
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
Efficient intrusion-resilient signatures without random oracles
Inscrypt'06 Proceedings of the Second SKLOIS conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient (SiBIR) signature schemes were defined in [IR02]. In this model, as in the case of forward security, time is divided into predefined time periods (e.g., days); each signature includes the number of the time period in which it was generated; while the public key remains the same, the secret keys evolve with time. In addition, in SiBIR model, the user has two modules, signer and home base: the former generates all signatures on its own, and the latter is needed only to help update the signer's key from one time period to the next. The main strength of the intrusion-resilient schemes, is that they remain secure even after arbitrarily many compromises of both modules, as long as the compromises are not simultaneous. Moreover, even if the intruder does compromise both modules simultaneously, she will still be unable to generate any signatures for the previous time periods (i.e., the forward security is guaranteed even in the case of simultaneous exposures). This paper provides the first generic implementation, called gSiBIR, of the intrusion-resilient signature schemes: it can be based on any ordinary signature scheme used as a black-box. gSiBIR is also the first SiBIR scheme secure against fully-adaptive adversary and does not require random oracle. Our construction does require one-way (and cryptographic hash) functions. Another contribution of this paper is a new mechanism extending tree-based constructions such as gSiBIR and that of [BM99] to avoid the limit on the total number of periods (required by [IR02] and many forward-secure ones). This mechanism is based on explicit use of prefixless (or self-delimiting) encodings. Applied to the generic forward-secure singature constructions of [BM99, MMM02], it extends the first and yields modest but noticable improvements to the second. With this mechanism, gSiBIR becomes the first generic intrusion-resilient signature scheme with no limit on the number of periods.