On a class of key agreement protocols which cannot be unconditionally secure

  • Authors:

  • Frank Niedermeyer;Werner Schindler

  • Affiliations:

  • Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, Germany;Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, Germany

  • Venue:
  • SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

In [5] a new key agreement protocol called CHIMERA was introduced which was supposed to be unconditionally secure. In this paper an attack against CHIMERA is described which needs little memory and computational power and is successful almost with probability 1. The bug in the security proof in [5] is explained. Further, it is shown that a whole class of CHIMERA-like key agreement protocols cannot be unconditionally secure.