An analysis of the Hermes8 stream ciphers

Authors:
Steve Babbage;Carlos Cid;Norbert Pramstaller;Håvard Raddum
Affiliations:
Vodafone Group R&D, Newbury, United Kingdom;Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom;IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria;Dept. of Informatics, The University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Venue:
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Hermes8 [6,7] is one of the stream ciphers submitted to the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project (eSTREAM [3]). In this paper we present an analysis of the Hermes8 stream ciphers. In particular, we show an attack on the latest version of the cipher (Hermes8F), which requires very few known keystream bytes and recovers the cipher secret key in less than a second on a normal PC. Furthermore, we make some remarks on the cipher's key schedule and discuss some properties of ciphers with similar algebraic structure to Hermes8.