Untraceable off-line cash in wallet with observers
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Improved privacy in wallets with observers
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Trustee-based tracing extensions to anonymous cash and the making of anonymous change
Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Digital payment systems with passive anonymity-revoking trustees
Journal of Computer Security
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Wallet Databases with Observers
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Statistically-Hiding Integer Commitment Scheme Based on Groups with Hidden Order
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Anonymity Control in E-Cash Systems
FC '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Distributed "magic ink" signatures
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient concurrent zero-knowledge in the auxiliary string model
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A signature scheme with efficient protocols
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
A cryptographic framework for the controlled release of certified data
SP'04 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Security Protocols
Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
How to Bypass Two Anonymity Revocation Schemes
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Minimal information disclosure with efficiently verifiable credentials
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital identity management
Solving revocation with efficient update of anonymous credentials
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Analysis of revocation strategies for anonymous Idemix credentials
CMS'11 Proceedings of the 12th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and multimedia security
FAUST: efficient, TTP-free abuse prevention by anonymous whitelisting
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Batch proofs of partial knowledge
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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We propose the first single sign-on system in which a user can access services using unlinkable digital pseudonyms that can all be revoked in case she abuses any one service. Our solution does not rely on key escrow: a user needs to trust only her own computing device with following our protocols in order to be assured of the unconditional untraceability and unlinkability of her pseudonyms. Our solution involves two novel ingredients: a technique for invisibly chaining the user's pseudonyms such that all of them can be revoked on the basis of any one of them (without knowing the user's identity with the issuer) and a sublinear-time proof that a committed value is not on a list without revealing additional information about the value. Our solution is highly practical.