Infringing key authentication of an ID-based group key exchange protocol using binary key trees

Authors:
Junghyun Nam;Juryon Paik;Youngsook Lee;Jin Kwak;Ung Mo Kim;Dongho Won
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Konkuk University, Korea;Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea;Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea;Department of Information Security, Soonchunhyang University, Korea;Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea;Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea
Venue:
KES'07/WIRN'07 Proceedings of the 11th international conference, KES 2007 and XVII Italian workshop on neural networks conference on Knowledge-based intelligent information and engineering systems: Part I
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Group key exchange protocols allow a group of parties communicating over a public network to come up with a common secret key called a session key. Due to their critical role in building secure multicast channels, a number of group key exchange protocols have been suggested over the years for a variety of settings. Among these is the ID-based group key exchange protocol proposed by Yang and Shieh in 2001. In this paper, we revisit the Yang-Shieh ID-based protocol and conduct a security analysis on the protocol. The consequence of our analysis is that the Yang-Shieh protocol fails to achieve its basic goal of securely establishing a session key among the intended parties. This is shown via a collusion attack on the protocol. We also show how to fix the security problem with the protocol.