Evolutionary dilemmas in a social network

  • Authors:
  • Leslie Luthi;Enea Pestelacci;Marco Tomassini

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Systems Institute, University of Lausanne, Switzerland;Information Systems Institute, University of Lausanne, Switzerland;Information Systems Institute, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • ECAL'07 Proceedings of the 9th European conference on Advances in artificial life
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.