An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Key storage in secure networks
Discrete Applied Mathematics
A matrix key-distribution scheme
Journal of Cryptology
A key-management scheme for distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secret-Key Agreement without Public-Key Cryptography
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Random key-assignment for secure Wireless Sensor Networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Trustworthy Computing under Resource Constraints with the DOWN Policy
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
An efficient key predistribution scheme for ad hoc network security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
N-ary tree based key distribution in a network as a service provisioning model
Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics
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Probabilistic key predistribution schemes (P-KPSs) which place modest demands on hardware are good candidates for securing interactions between resource limited computers. Collusion susceptible P-KPSs are trade-offs between security and complexity. Some facets of complexity include computation, bandwidth, and storage overhead. Metrics for security include resistance to passive eavesdropping attacks, and active message injection attacks. The contributions of this paper are three-fold: 1) a novel P-KPS, the subset keys and identity tickets (SKIT) scheme; 2) a generic KPS model to facilitate comparison of various facets of the complexity of key predistribution schemes; and 3) a new security model to describe the resistance of P-KPSs to active message-injection attacks. The two models are used to show why SKIT has many compelling advantages over existing P-KPSs in the literature. In particular, while placing lower demands on computation, bandwidth and storage overhead, SKIT realizes substantial improvements in resistance to passive and active attacks.