Fine-grained privilege separation for web applications

  • Authors:
  • Akshay Krishnamurthy;Adrian Mettler;David Wagner

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA;University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA;University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
  • Year:
  • 2010

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We present a programming model for building web applications with security properties that can be confidently verified during a security review. In our model, applications are divided into isolated, privilege-separated components, enabling rich security policies to be enforced in a way that can be checked by reviewers. In our model, the web framework enforces privilege separation and isolation of web applications by requiring the use of an object-capability language and providing interfaces that expose limited, explicitly-specified privileges to application components. This approach restricts what each component of the application can do and quarantines buggy or compromised code. It also provides a way to more safely integrate third-party, less-trusted code into a web application. We have implemented a prototype of this model based upon the Java Servlet framework and used it to build a webmail application. Our experience with this example suggests that the approach is viable and helpful at establishing reviewable application-specific security properties.