Memory resource management in VMware ESX server
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - OSDI '02: Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Obfuscation of executable code to improve resistance to static disassembly
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking
ASPLOS XI Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Minos: Control Data Attack Prevention Orthogonal to Memory Model
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
Intel Virtualization Technology
Computer
Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel
Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel
Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks via Pointer Taintedness Detection
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
The essence of command injection attacks in web applications
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Base Address Recognition with Data Flow Tracking for Injection Attack Detection
PRDC '06 Proceedings of the 12th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
QEMU, a fast and portable dynamic translator
ATEC '05 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Raksha: a flexible information flow architecture for software security
Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
Non-control-data attacks are realistic threats
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Securing software by enforcing data-flow integrity
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Making information flow explicit in HiStar
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Panorama: capturing system-wide information flow for malware detection and analysis
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Real-world buffer overflow protection for userspace & kernelspace
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Complete information flow tracking from the gates up
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Pointless tainting?: evaluating the practicality of pointer tainting
Proceedings of the 4th ACM European conference on Computer systems
Measuring channel capacity to distinguish undue influence
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Fourth Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Nemesis: preventing authentication & access control vulnerabilities in web applications
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Pointer tainting still pointless: (but we all see the point of tainting)
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
TaintEraser: protecting sensitive data leaks using application-level taint tracking
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
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Pointer tainting is a form of Dynamic Information Flow Tracking used primarily to prevent software security attacks such as buffer overflows. Researchers have also applied pointer tainting to malware and virus analysis. A recent paper by Slowinska and Bos has criticized pointer tainting as a security mechanism, arguing that it is has serious, inherent false positive and false negative defects. We present a rebuttal that addresses the confusion due to the two uses of pointer tainting in security literature. We clarify that many of the arguments against pointer tainting apply only to its use as a malware and virus analysis platform, but do not apply to the application of pointer tainting to memory corruption protection. Hence, we argue that pointer tainting remains a useful and promising technique for robust protection against memory corruption attacks.