R-LEAP+: randomizing LEAP+ key distribution to resist replay and jamming attacks

  • Authors:
  • Sam Blackshear;Rakesh M. Verma

  • Affiliations:
  • Williams College, Williamstown, Massachussetts;University of Houston, Houston, Texas

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The unique properties of wireless sensor networks make key distribution a particularly difficult problem. Two protocols, LEAP+ and Eschenauer-Gligor (EG), offer creative and effective solutions to this problem via time-limited key establishment and randomized key pre-distribution, respectively. However, LEAP+ key establishment may be thwarted by jamming attacks, and EG is vulnerable to node compromise attacks. In this paper, we offer a hybrid of these two schemes that preserves the desirable properties of each scheme, but is immune to each scheme's greatest weakness.