SPHINX: a framework for creating personal, site-specific Web crawlers
WWW7 Proceedings of the seventh international conference on World Wide Web 7
Polygraph: Automatically Generating Signatures for Polymorphic Worms
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Towards Automatic Generation of Vulnerability-Based Signatures
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
MisleadingWorm Signature Generators Using Deliberate Noise Injection
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hamsa: Fast Signature Generation for Zero-day PolymorphicWorms with Provable Attack Resilience
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
Autograph: toward automated, distributed worm signature detection
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
FLIPS: hybrid adaptive intrusion prevention
RAID'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Polymorphic worm detection using structural information of executables
RAID'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Allergy attack against automatic signature generation
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Paragraph: thwarting signature learning by training maliciously
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Exploiting machine learning to subvert your spam filter
LEET'08 Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats
Open problems in the security of learning
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Workshop on AISec
Bagging classifiers for fighting poisoning attacks in adversarial classification tasks
MCS'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Multiple classifier systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Security and artificial intelligence
Adversarial attacks against intrusion detection systems: Taxonomy, solutions and open issues
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Hi-index | 0.00 |
As research in automatic signature generators (ASGs) receives more attention, various attacks against these systems are being identified. One of these attacks is the "allergy attack" which induces the target ASG into generating harmful signatures to filter out normal traffic at the perimeter defense, resulting in a DoS against the protected network. It is tempting to attribute the success of allergy attacks to a failure in not checking the generated signatures against a corpus of known "normal" traffic, as suggested by some researchers. In this paper, we argue that the problem is more fundamental in nature; the alleged "solution" is not effective against allergy attacks as long as the normal traffic exhibits certain characteristics that are commonly found in reality. We have come up with two advanced allergy attacks that cannot be stopped by a corpus-based defense. We also propose a page-rank-based metric for quantifying the damage caused by an allergy attack. Both the analysis based on the proposed metric and our experiments with Polygraph and Hamsa show that the advanced attacks presented will block out 10% to 100% of HTTP requests to the three websites studied: CNN.com, Amazon. com and Google.com.