Verifying security protocols for sensor networks using algebraic specification techniques

Authors:
Iakovos Ouranos;Petros Stefaneas
Affiliations:
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens;School of Applied Mathematical and Physical Sciences, National Technical University of Athens
Venue:
CAI'07 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Algebraic informatics
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Algebraic specification languages are formal methods that provide a rigorous basis for modeling of several systems. Security protocols are safety critical systems that need to be verified before their implementation. In this paper we have formally specified sensor network encryption protocol (SNEP) and a key agreement protocol for sensor networks, both from the SPINS protocol suite, with the OTS/CafeOBJ method, a well known formal specification technique applied not only in research, but also in industry. Based on this specification, we have proved that each protocol possesses an important safety(invariant) property.