Methods and logics for proving programs
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
The temporal logic of reactive and concurrent systems
The temporal logic of reactive and concurrent systems
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Public-key encryption in a multi-user setting: security proofs and improvements
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Adaptive security of symbolic encryption
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Completing the picture: soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Computational Soundness of Symbolic Analysis for Protocols Using Hash Functions
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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The composition of security definitions is a subtle issue. As most security protocols use a combination of security primitives, it is important to have general results that allow to combine such definitions. We present here a general result of composition for security criteria (i.e. security requirements). This result can be applied to deduce security of a criterion from security of one of its sub-criterion and an indistinguishability criterion. To illustrate our result, we introduce joint security for asymmetric and symmetric cryptography and prove that it is equivalent to classical security assumptions for both the asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes. Using this, we give a modular proof of computational soundness of symbolic encryption. This result holds in the case of an adaptive adversary which can use both asymmetric and symmetric encryption.