Proxy re-signature schemes without random oracles

Authors:
Jun Shao;Zhenfu Cao;Licheng Wang;Xiaohui Liang
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, P.R. China
Venue:
INDOCRYPT'07 Proceedings of the cryptology 8th international conference on Progress in cryptology
Year:
2007

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Abstract

To construct a suitable and secure proxy re-signature scheme is not an easy job, up to now, there exist only three schemes, one is proposed by Blaze et al. [6] at EUROCRYPT 1998, and the others are proposed by Ateniese and Hohenberger [2] at ACM CCS 2005. However, none of these schemes is proved in the standard model (i.e., do not rely on the random oracle heuristic). In this paper, based on Waters' approach [20], we first propose a multi-use bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, denoted as Smb, which is existentially unforgeable in the standard model. And then, we extend Smb to be a multi-use bidirectional ID-based proxy re-signature scheme, denoted by Sid-mb, which is also existentially unforgeable in the standard model. Both of these two proposed schemes are computationally efficient, and their security bases on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.