Computationally-efficient password authenticated key exchange based on quadratic residues

  • Authors:
  • Muxiang Zhang

  • Affiliations:
  • Verizon Communications Inc., Waltham, MA

  • Venue:
  • INDOCRYPT'07 Proceedings of the cryptology 8th international conference on Progress in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a computationally efficient password authenticated key exchange protocol based on quadratic residues. The protocol, called QR-CEKE, is derived from the protocol QR-EKE, a previously published password authenticated key exchange protocol based on quadratic residues. The computational time for the client, however, is significant reduced in the protocol QR-CEKE. In comparison with QR-EKE, the protocol QR-CEKE is more suitable to an imbalanced computing environment where a low-end client device communicates with a powerful server over a broadband network. Based on number-theoretic techniques, we show that the computationally efficient password authenticated key exchange protocol is secure against residue attacks, a special type of off-line dictionary attack against password-authenticated key exchange protocols based on factorization. We also provide a formal security analysis of QR-CEKE under the factoring assumption and the random oracle model.