Fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Generalized Inversion Attack on Nonlinear Filter Generators
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A fast correlation attack on LILI-128
Information Processing Letters
A New Cryptanalytic Attack for PN-generators Filtered by a Boolean Function
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Fast Correlation Attacks: An Algorithmic Point of View
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Conditional Correlation Attack on Nonlinear Filter Generators
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of Nonlinear Filter Generators
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Vectorial Approach to Fast Correlation Attacks
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Decrypting a Class of Stream Ciphers Using Ciphertext Only
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Improved fast correlation attacks using parity-check equations of weight 4 and 5
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with linear feedback
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
A new simple technique to attack filter generators and related ciphers
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A general formulation of algebraic and fast correlation attacks based on dedicated sample decimation
AAECC'06 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
A New Attack on the Filter Generator
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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The filter generator is an important building block in many stream ciphers. We present here an attack that recovers the initial state of the hidden LFSR by detecting the positions where the inputs of the filtering function are equal to zero. This attack requires the precomputation of low weight multiples of the LFSR generating polynomial. By a careful analysis, we show that the attack complexity is among the best known and work for almost all cryptographic filtering functions.