Effects of neighbourhood structure on evolution of cooperation in N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma

Authors:
Raymond Chiong;Sandeep Dhakal;Lubo Jankovic
Affiliations:
School of IT & Multimedia, Swinburne University of Technology, Sarawak, Malaysia;School of IT & Multimedia, Swinburne University of Technology, Sarawak, Malaysia;InteSys Ltd, Birmingham, UK
Venue:
IDEAL'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Intelligent data engineering and automated learning
Year:
2007

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Abstract

In multi-agent systems, complex and dynamic interactions often emerge among individual agents. The ability of each agent to learn adaptively is therefore important for them to survive in such changing environment. In this paper, we consider the effects of neighbourhood structure on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in the N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD). We simulate the NIPD as a bidding game on a two dimensional grid-world, where each agent has to bid against its neighbours based on a chosen game strategy. We conduct experiments with three different types of neighbourhood structures, namely the triangular neighbourhood structure, the rectangular neighbourhood structure and the random pairing structure. Our results show that cooperation does emerge under the triangular neighbourhood structure, but defection prevails under the rectangular neighbourhood structure as well as the random pairing structure.