Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
One-way accumulators: a decentralized alternative to digital signatures
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Efficient Identity Based Signature Schemes Based on Pairings
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Identity-Based Signature from Gap Diffie-Hellman Groups
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Collision-free accumulators and fail-stop signature schemes without trees
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Efficient identity-based signatures secure in the standard model
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
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We introduce a new identity-based signature scheme that possesses the feature of mutability in terms of its mutable signer identity. We name this new signature scheme Mutative Identity-Based Signature (MIBS). The merit of this proposed scheme lies in the novel property on protection of private information such as birthdate, social security number, credit card number, etc. that have to be employed as part of a user identity served as a public key. In MIBS, we allow all these private information to serve as a user identity, while only one of these information (along with the user name, as non-secret part of a user identity) is revealed to the verifier. For example, when using a signature to a legitimate merchant, only the credit card number and the user name are revealed without leaking other private information. This signature scheme is naturally associated with a dynamic credential system, where a signature accommodates the feature of a secret credential. We provide a security model and then prove its security based on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem and the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in the standard model.