Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
EuroPKI 2006 Proceedings of the Third European conference on Public Key Infrastructure: theory and Practice
CBE from CL-PKE: a generic construction and efficient schemes
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
Certificateless public key encryption without pairing
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
On constructing certificateless cryptosystems from identity based encryption
PKC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography
General Certificateless Encryption and Timed-Release Encryption
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
RSA-Based Certificateless Public Key Encryption
ISPEC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Further Observations on Certificateless Public Key Encryption
Information Security and Cryptology
Certificateless public key encryption: A new generic construction and two pairing-free schemes
Theoretical Computer Science
Cryptanalysis of certificateless signcryption schemes and an efficient construction without pairing
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Provably secure certificate-based signature scheme without pairings
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CLPKC) enjoys the advantage of ID-based public key cryptography without suffering from the key escrow problem. In 2005, Baek et al. proposed the first certificateless encryption (CLPKE) scheme that does not depend on pairing. Although it provides high efficiency, one drawback of their scheme is that the security proof only holds for a weaker security model in which the Type I adversary is not allowed to replace the public key associated with the challenge identity. In this paper, we eliminate this limitation and construct a strongly secure CLPKE scheme without pairing. We prove that the proposed scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack in the random oracle model, provided that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable.