Cryptanalysis of Tso et al.'s ID-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol

  • Authors:

  • Meng-Hui Lim;Sanggon Lee;Sangjae Moon

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Ubiquitous IT, Graduate School of Design & IT, Dongseo University, Busan, Korea;Division of Internet Engineering, Dongseo University, Busan, Korea;School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National University, Daegu, Korea

  • Venue:
  • ICISS'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information systems security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is generally designed to accommodate the need of three specific entities in communicating over an open network with a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity. Since Joux [6] initiates the development of tripartite key agreement protocol, many prominent tripartite schemes have been proposed subsequently. In 2005, Tso et al. [15] have proposed an ID-based non-interactive tripartite key agreement scheme with k-resilience. Based on this scheme, they have further proposed another one-round tripartite application scheme. Although they claimed that both schemes are efficient and secure, we discover that both schemes are in fact breakable. In this paper, we impose several impersonation attacks on Tso et al.'s schemes in order to highlight their flaws. Subsequently, we propose some applicable enhancements which will not only conquer their defects, but also preserve the security attributes of an ideal key agreement protocol.