Two notes on the security of certificateless signatures

  • Authors:
  • Rafael Castro;Ricardo Dahab

  • Affiliations:
  • UNICAMP, Brazil;UNICAMP, Brazil

  • Venue:
  • ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We discuss two common pitfalls found in proofs of security of various certificateless signature (CLS) schemes. As a result of the first observation, we are able to show that a CLS scheme ([Goy06]), previously thought to be secure, is vulnerable to a key replacement attack. We then proceed to define a class of CLS schemes whose security is provable by standard techniques, leading to a more efficient version of a known CLS scheme ([ARP03]) and a (previously unknown) security proof for another ([LCS05]).