Database security
The multipolicy paradigm for trusted systems
NSPW '92-93 Proceedings on the 1992-1993 workshop on New security paradigms
XML document security based on provisional authorization
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Protection in operating systems
Communications of the ACM
Protection and the control of information sharing in multics
Communications of the ACM
HYDRA: the kernel of a multiprocessor operating system
Communications of the ACM
Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations
Communications of the ACM
An algebra for composing access control policies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
An Authorization Model for Federated Systems
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Generalized Secret Sharing and Monotone Functions
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On Safety in Discretionary Access Control
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
XacT: a bridge between resource management and access control in multi-layered applications
SESS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Software engineering for secure systems—building trustworthy applications
A Linear time algorithm for deciding security
SFCS '76 Proceedings of the 17th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Platform for enterprise privacy practices: privacy-enabled management of customer data
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
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In the context of regulatory compliance, the question is often whether an enterprise can guarantee that only certain people can access certain data or perform certain business functions on them. Examples are controls over financial data in Sarbanes-Oxley and access to personal information in privacy laws such as HIPAA and the California Senate Bill 1386. Such guarantees also have to be strictly audited. For individual access control systems, such questions are standard at least in theory. However, to the best of our knowledge such questions have never been addressed for entire system stacks containing multiple layers of data representation with potentially different access mechanisms. For instance, financial data may be accessed by using an access right to the official financial application, but also by using an administrator right to an underlying database or by logically or physically accessing an unencrypted backup tape with the data. We propose an overall model and algorithms to deal with this situation. We study both advance queries for validating a proposed system and a posteriori queries in audit, problem determination, or litigation.