A key distribution scheme preventing collusion attacks in ubiquitous heterogeneous sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Firdous Kausar;Sajid Hussain;Jong Hyuk Park;Ashraf Masood

  • Affiliations:
  • College of Signals, NUST, Rawalpindi, Pakistan;Jodrey School of Computer Science, Acadia University, Nova Scotia, Canada;Department of Computer Engineering, Kyungnam University, Masan, Korea;College of Signals, NUST, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

  • Venue:
  • EUC'07 Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Emerging direction in embedded and ubiquitous computing
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Random key pre-distribution schemes are vulnerable to collusion attacks. In this paper, we propose a new key management scheme for ubiquitous heterogeneous sensor networks consisting of a small number of powerful high-end H-sensors and a large number of ordinary low-end L-sensors. The collusion attack on key pre-distribution scheme mainly takes advantage of the globally applicable keys, which are selected from the same key pool. As a result, in our scheme, after discovering the shared pairwise keys with neighbors, all H-nodes and L-nodes destroy their initial key rings and generate new key rings by applying one-way hash function on node's ID and initial key ring. The analysis of proposed scheme shows that even if a large number of nodes are compromised, an adversary can only exploit a small number of keys nearby the compromised nodes, while other keys in the network remain safe. It outperforms the previous random key pre-distribution schemes by considerably reducing the storage requirement, while providing more resiliency against node capture and collusion attacks.