On the performance of congestion games for optimum satisfiability problems

  • Authors:
  • Aristotelis Giannakos;Laurent Gourvès;Jérôme Monnot;Vangelis Th. Paschos

  • Affiliations:
  • LAMSADE, CNRS, UMR, Université de Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France;LAMSADE, CNRS, UMR, Université de Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France;LAMSADE, CNRS, UMR, Université de Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France;LAMSADE, CNRS, UMR, Université de Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France

  • Venue:
  • WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We introduce and study a congestion game having MAX SAT as an underlying structure and show that its price of anarchy is 1/2. The main result is a redesign of the game leading to an improved price of anarchy of 2/3 from which we derive a non oblivious local search algorithm for MAX SAT with locality gap 2/3. A similar congestion MIN SAT game is also studied.