Adwords auctions with decreasing valuation bids

  • Authors:
  • Gagan Goel;Aranyak Mehta

  • Affiliations:
  • Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA;Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA

  • Venue:
  • WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

The choice of a bidding language is crucial in auction design in order to correctly capture bidder utilities. We propose a new bidding model for the Adwords auctions of search engine advertisement - decreasing valuation bids. This provides a richer language than the current model for advertisers to convey their preferences. Besides providing more expressivity, our bidding model has two additional advantages: It is an add-on to the standard model, and retains its simplicity of expression. Furthermore, it allows efficient algorithms - we show that the greedy (highest bid) algorithm retains its factor of 1/2 from the standard bidding model, and also provide an optimal allocation algorithm with a factor of 1-1/e (as is case in the standard bidding model). We also show how these bidding languages achieve a good trade-off between expressivity and complexity - we demonstrate a slight generalization of these models for which the greedy allocation algorithm has an arbitrarily bad competitive ratio.