Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS ...
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Side-Channel Attacks on Symmetric Encryption Schemes: The Case for Authenticated Encryption
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Efficient Error-Propagating Block Chaining
Proceedings of the 6th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
User's Guide To Cryptography And Standards (Artech House Computer Security)
User's Guide To Cryptography And Standards (Artech House Computer Security)
Padding oracle attacks on CBC-Mode encryption with secret and random IVs
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Cryptanalysis of two variants of PCBC mode when used for message integrity
ACISP'05 Proceedings of the 10th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
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A large variety of methods for using block ciphers, so called 'modes of operation', have been proposed, including some designed to provide both confidentiality and integrity protection. Such modes, usually known as 'authenticated encryption' modes, are increasingly important given the variety of issues now known with the use of unauthenticated encryption. In this paper we show that a mode known as EPBC (Efficient error-Propagating Block Chaining), proposed in 1997 by Zúquete and Guedes, is insecure. Specifically we show that given a modest amount of known plaintext for a single enciphered message, new enciphered messages can be constructed which will pass tests for authenticity. That is, we demonstrate a message forgery attack.