Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Postal Revenue Collection in the Digital Age
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Energy Analysis of Public-Key Cryptography for Wireless Sensor Networks
PERCOM '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
The exact security of digital signatures-how to sign with RSA and Rabin
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Tag-KEM/DEM: a new framework for hybrid encryption and a new analysis of kurosawa-desmedt KEM
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Constructing better KEMs with partial message recovery
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
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Constructing efficient and secure encryption schemes is an important motivation for modern cryptographic research. We propose simple and secure constructions of hybrid encryption schemes that aim to keep message expansion to a minimum, in particular for RSA-based protocols. We show that one can encrypt using RSA a message of length |m| bits, at a security level equivalent to a block cipher of k bits in security, in |m|+4k + 2 bits. This is therefore independent of how large the RSA key length grows as a function of k. Our constructions are natural and highly practical, but do not appear to have been given any previous formal treatment.