ICRep: an incentive compatible reputation mechanism for P2P systems

  • Authors:
  • Junsheng Chang;Huaimin Wang;Gang Yin;Yangbin Tang

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, HuNan, Changsha, China;School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, HuNan, Changsha, China;School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, HuNan, Changsha, China;School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, HuNan, Changsha, China

  • Venue:
  • WISA'07 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information security applications
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, peers often must interact with unknown or unfamiliar peers without the benefit of trusted third parties or authorities to mediate the interactions. Trust management through reputation mechanism to facilitate such interactions is recognized as an important element of P2P systems. It is, however, faced by the problems of how to stimulate reputation information sharing and honest recommendation elicitation. This paper presents ICRep - an incentive compatible reputation mechanism for P2P systems. ICRep has two unique features: (i) a recommender's credibility and level of confidence about the recommendation is considered in order to achieve a more accurate calculation of reputations and fair evaluation of recommendations. (ii) Incentive for participation and honest recommendation is implemented through a fair differential service mechanism. It relies on peer's level of participation and on the recommendation credibility. Theoretic analysis and simulation show that ICRep can help peers effectively detect dishonest recommendations in a variety of scenarios where more complex malicious strategies are introduced. Moreover, it can also stimulate peers to send sufficiently honest recommendations.