A One Round Protocol for Tripartite Diffie-Hellman
ANTS-IV Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Oblivious signature-based envelope
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Brief announcement: a flexible framework for secret handshakes
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
WCC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Coding and Cryptography
Three-round secret handshakes based on elgamal and DSA
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Efficient multi-receiver identity-based encryption and its application to broadcast encryption
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
Revisiting oblivious signature-based envelopes
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Authentication for paranoids: multi-party secret handshakes
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Secret handshakes from ID-based message recovery signatures: A new generic approach
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Private mutual authentications with fuzzy matching
International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture
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In a secret handshake protocol, an honest member in the group will never reveal his group affiliation unless the other party is a valid member of the same group. However, most prior work of secret handshake are for 2-party secret handshakes. Tsudik and Xu extended the notion of secret handshake to a multi-party setting in 2005. Unfortunately, this seminal work is rather inefficient, since they consider a generic construction of such a scheme. Following this work, Jarecki et al. proposed an efficient solution to multi-party secret handshake. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that Jarecki et al.'s scheme has some drawbacks and therefore the scheme does not fulfill the security requirements of secret handshake. Secondly, we present a new construction of the group secret handshake scheme. In a group secret handshake protocol, a valid member in the group should never reveals his group affiliation unless all the other parties are valid members of the same group. In other words, if a handshake among this group of parties fails, the identities of every involved parties will not be disclosed. We then show that our scheme is secure under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.