Preventing unofficial information propagation

  • Authors:
  • Zhengyi Le;Yi Ouyang;Yurong Xu;James Ford;Fillia Makedon

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH;Computer Science Department, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH;Computer Science Department, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH;Heracleia Lab, Computer Science and Engineering Department, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX;Heracleia Lab, Computer Science and Engineering Department, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX

  • Venue:
  • ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Digital copies are susceptible to theft and vulnerable to leakage, copying, or manipulation. When someone (or some group), who has stolen, leaked, copied, or manipulated digital documents propagates the documents over the Internet and/or distributes those through physical distribution channels many challenges arise which document holders must overcome in order to mitigate the impact to their privacy or business. This paper focuses on the propagation problem of digital credentials, which may contain sensitive information about a credential holder. Existing work such as access control policies and the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) assumes that qualified or certified credential viewers are honest and reliable. The proposed approach in this paper uses short-lived credentials based on reverse forward secure signatures to remove this assumption and mitigate the damage caused by a dishonest or honest but compromised viewer.