A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Incoercible multiparty computation
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Kleptography: using cryptography against cryptography
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Malicious cryptography: kleptographic aspects
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
A space efficient backdoor in RSA and its applications
SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Deniable cloud storage: sharing files via public-key deniability
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Privacy-preserving outsourcing of brute-force key searches
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
A new spin on quantum cryptography: avoiding trapdoors and embracing public keys
PQCrypto'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Deniable encryptions secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
RopSteg: program steganography with return oriented programming
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
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A party using encrypted communication or storing data in an encrypted form might be forced to show the corresponding plaintext. It may happen for law enforcement reasons as well as for evil purposes. Deniable encryption scheme introduced by Canetti et al. shows that cryptography can be used against revealing information: the owner of the data may decrypt it in an alternative way to a harmless plaintext. Moreover, it is impossible to check if there is another hidden plaintext. The scheme of Canetti is inefficient in the sense that it is a special purpose scheme and using it indicates that there is some hidden message inside. We show that deniable encryption can be implemented in a different way so that it does not point to exploiting deniable encryption. Moreover, it is quite straightforward, so it can be used for both good and evil purposes. Apart from that we show that even the special purpose original scheme can be extended to allow, in some circumstances, any "depth" of deniability.