A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme: a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A practical voter-verifiable election scheme
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
A practical voting scheme with receipts
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
Prêt à voter with re-encryption mixes
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Analysis, improvement and simplification of Prêt à voter with Paillier encryption
EVT'08 Proceedings of the conference on Electronic voting technology
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Kutylowski et al. have introduced a voter-verifiable electronic voting scheme "a practical voting scheme with receipts", which provides each voter with a receipt. The voter can use her receipt to check whether her vote has been properly counted in the final tally, but she cannot use the receipt to prove others how she has voted. Another interesting property of this scheme is that, thanks to the repetitive robustness mix network, the ballot tallying phase only needs to be audited if the final results fail to achieve some conditions. However, we will show that this scheme is vulnerable to some threats, adversaries can not only violate voter privacy, but also forge the election result.