Chosen IV statistical analysis for key recovery attacks on stream ciphers

  • Authors:
  • Simon Fischer;Shahram Khazaei;Willi Meier

  • Affiliations:
  • FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland;EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland;FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • AFRICACRYPT'08 Proceedings of the Cryptology in Africa 1st international conference on Progress in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

A recent framework for chosen IV statistical distinguishing analysis of stream ciphers is exploited and formalized to provide new methods for key recovery attacks. As an application, a key recovery attack on simplified versions of two eSTREAM Phase 3 candidates is given: For Grain-128 with IV initialization reduced to up to 180 of its 256 iterations, and for Trivium with IV initialization reduced to up to 672 of its 1152 iterations, it is experimentally demonstrated how to deduce a few key bits. Evidence is given that the present analysis is not applicable on Grain-128 or Trivium with full IV initialization.