Generative communication in Linda
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Software engineering
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Coordination languages and their significance
Communications of the ACM
Coordinating processes with secure spaces
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on coordination languages and architectures
A Java Middleware for Guaranteeing Privacy of Distributed Tuple Spaces
FIDJI '01 Revised Papers from the International Workshop on Scientific Engineering for Distributed Java Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Secure shared data-space coordination languages: a process algebraic surveys
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on security issues in coordination models, languages, and systems
Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces
Fundamenta Informaticae
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Strong accountability for network storage
ACM Transactions on Storage (TOS)
Coordination with multicapabilities
COORDINATION'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Coordination Models and Languages
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The deployment of Share Data Spaces in open, possibly hostile, environments arises the need of protecting the confidentiality of the data space content. Existing approaches focus on access control mechanisms that protect the data space from untrusted agents. The basic assumption is that the hosts (and their administrators) where the data space is deployed have to be trusted. Encryption schemes can be used to protect the data space content from malicious hosts. However, these schemes do not allow searching on encrypted data. In this paper we present a novel encryption scheme that allows tuple matching on completely encrypted tuples. Since the data space does not need to decrypt tuples to perform the search, tuple confidentiality can be guaranteed even when the data space is deployed on malicious hosts (or an adversary gains access to the host). Our scheme does not require authorised agents to share keys for inserting and retrieving tuples. Each authorised agent can encrypt, decrypt, and search encrypted tuples without having to know other agents' keys. This is beneficial inasmuch as it simplifies the task of key management. An implementation of an encrypted data space based on this scheme is described and some preliminary performance results are given.