A game-theoretic analysis of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

Authors:
Suchul Lee;Hwanseok Choi;Chong-Kwon Kim
Affiliations:
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National University, Seoul, Koera;Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National University, Seoul, Koera;Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National University, Seoul, Koera
Venue:
ISCIT'09 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Communications and information technologies
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We address the problem of spectrum sharing with spectrum pricing where the primary user wants to sell the spectrum to the secondary users in cognitive radio networks(CRNs). By equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the players in the spectrum sharing game aims to take the strategy to maximize its own profit under sojourn-time constraint for secondary users. In condition of spectrum sojourn-time is limited because of primary user's channel usage pattern each of spectrum providers will choose different strategy to increase profit more. With the Bertrand model we analyze the impacts of several secondary users' preference to spectrum product provided by primary user. (i.e., channel quality, spectrum substitutability and sojourn-time).