Imperatives as obligatory and permitted actions

  • Authors:
  • Miguel Pérez-Ramírez;Chris Fox

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom;Computer Science Department, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom

  • Venue:
  • CICLing'03 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Computational linguistics and intelligent text processing
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We present a dynamic deontic model for the interpretation of imperative sentences in terms of Obligation (O) and Permission (P). Under the view that imperatives prescribe actions and unlike the so-called "standard solution" (Huntley [10]) these operators act over actions rather that over statements. By distinguishing obligatory from non-obligatory actions we tackle the paradox of Free Choice Permission (FCP).