DFCA: a flexible refundable auction for limited capacity suppliers

Authors:
Zhixing Huang;Shigeo Matsubara
Affiliations:
Semantic Grid Laboratory, Faculty of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, China and Global Information Network Laboratory, Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto Uni ...;Global Information Network Laboratory, Department of Social Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
Venue:
GECON'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Grid economics and business models
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel auction-based mechanisms named Decreasing Cancellation Fee Auction (DCFA) for task allocation in the environment where a service provider has finite capacities and consumers could withdraw their bids. We consider a new type of auction called the refundable auction, i. e. refund means that a consumer's showing up is uncertain and he can get back partial of his payment if his cancellation or no-show occurs. This mechanism can boost seller revenue, satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality and still hold a high efficiency.