A syntactic approach to type soundness
Information and Computation
SAFKASI: a security mechanism for language-based systems
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Java Virtual Machine Specification
Java Virtual Machine Specification
Java Security: From HotJava to Netscape and Beyond
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A new approach to mobile code security
A new approach to mobile code security
Stack inspection and secure program transformations
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on security in global computing
Static check analysis for Java stack inspection
ACM SIGPLAN Notices
USITS'97 Proceedings of the USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems on USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems
A Scheme for Protecting the Information Leakage Via Portable Devices
SECUREWARE '07 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems, and Technologies
Various Extensions for the Ambient OSGi Framework
International Journal of Adaptive, Resilient and Autonomic Systems
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Extensible Component Platforms support the discovery, installation, starting, uninstallation of components at runtime. Since they are often targeted at mobile resource-constrained devices, they have both strong performance and security requirements. The current security model for Java systems - Permissions - is based on call stack analysis. This is very time-consuming, which makes it difficult to use in production environments. We therefore define the Component-Based Access Control (CBAC) Security Model, which emulates Java Permissions through static analysis at the installation phase of the components. CBAC is based on a fully declarative approach that makes it possible to tag arbitrary methods as sensitive. A formal model is defined to guarantee that a given component have sufficient access rights, and that dependencies between components are taken into account. A first implementation of the model is provided for the OSGi Platform, using the ASM library for code analysis. Performance tests show that the cost of CBAC at install time is negligible, since it is executed together with digital signature verification which is much more costly. Moreover, unlike Java Permissions, the CBAC security model does not have any runtime overhead.