Randomized algorithms
Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis
Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Binary causal-adversary channels
ISIT'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 4
Detection of algebraic manipulation with applications to robust secret sharing and fuzzy extractors
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this work we consider the communication of information in the presence of an online adversarial jammer. In the setting under study, a sender wishes to communicate a message to a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, ... , xn) symbol-by-symbol over a communication channel. The adversarial jammer can view the transmitted symbols xi one at a time, and can change up to a p-fraction of them. However, for each symbol xi the jammer's decision on whether to corrupt it or not (and on how to change it) must depend only on xj for j ≤ i. This is in contrast to the "classical" adversarial jammer which may base its decisions on its complete knowledge of x. More generally, for a delay parameter d ∈ (0, 1), we study the scenario in which the jammer's decision on the corruption of xi must depend solely on xj for j ≤ i - dn. In this work, the transmitted symbols are assumed to be over a sufficiently large field F. We present a tight characterization of the amount of information one can transmit in both the 0- delay and, more generally, the d-delay online setting. We show that for 0-delay adversaries, the achievable rate asymptotically equals that of the classical adversarial model. For positive values of d, we consider two types of jamming, additive and overwrite. We also extend our results to a jam-or-listen online model, where the online adversary can either jam a symbol or eavesdrop on it.