Two Ways to Common Knowledge

Authors:
Samuel Bucheli;Roman Kuznets;Thomas Studer
Affiliations:
Institut für Informatik und angewandte Mathematik, Universität Bern, Bern, Switzerland;Institut für Informatik und angewandte Mathematik, Universität Bern, Bern, Switzerland;Institut für Informatik und angewandte Mathematik, Universität Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Venue:
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Year:
2010

Citing 9
Cited 0

An automata theoretic decision procedure for the propositional mu-calculus

Information and Computation
Local model checking in the modal mu-calculus

TAPSOFT '89 2nd international joint conference on Theory and practice of software development
Reasoning about knowledge

Reasoning about knowledge
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science

Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Justified common knowledge

Theoretical Computer Science - Clifford lectures and the mathematical foundations of programming semantics
Justified and Common Knowledge: Limited Conservativity

LFCS '07 Proceedings of the international symposium on Logical Foundations of Computer Science
Logical omniscience as a computational complexity problem

Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Self-Referential Justifications in Epistemic Logic

Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Computer Science; Guest Editors: Sergei Artemov, Volker Diekert and Alexander Razborov
A proof system for the linear time μ-calculus

FSTTCS'06 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

It is not clear what a system for evidence-based common knowledge should look like if common knowledge is treated as a greatest fixed point. This paper is a preliminary step towards such a system. We argue that the standard induction rule is not well suited to axiomatize evidence-based common knowledge. As an alternative, we study two different deductive systems for the logic of common knowledge. The first system makes use of an induction axiom whereas the second one is based on co-inductive proof theory. We show the soundness and completeness for both systems.