On congestion pricing in a wireless network
Wireless Networks
CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Elasticity Considerations for Optimal Pricing of Networks
ISCC '03 Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Communications
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
Power Control in Wireless Cellular Networks
Foundations and Trends® in Networking
Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We study the problem of revenue management in a cognitive spectrum underlay network, where the primary user chooses the bandwidth and tolerable interference levels for the secondary users. We show that the interference received by each secondary user is the same in a large system regime, and a simple pricing scheme achieves the efficient resource allocation at the market clearing equilibrium. We further show that the key for the primary user to maximize revenue is to consider the secondary users' power-interference elasticity, which is a new concept proposed and is different from all elasticity concepts used in the previous networking literature. When this elasticity is negative (positive, respectively), the primary user should increase (decrease, respectively) the bandwidth and tolerable interference level to increase revenue.