Evaluation and Design of Online Cooperative Feedback Mechanisms for Reputation Management
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard
Information Systems Research
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Designing aggregation mechanisms for reputation systems in online marketplaces
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Subjective review-based reputation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
A tree-network model for mining short message services seed users and its empirical analysis
Knowledge-Based Systems
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
Aseller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now whereas honest behavior results in a better reputation---and thus higher payments---in the future. We study the Window Aggregation Mechanism, a widely used class of mechanisms that shows the average value of the seller's ratings within some fixed window of past transactions. We suggest approaches for choosing the window size that maximizes the range of parameters for which it is optimal for the seller to be truthful. We show that mechanisms that use information from a larger number of past transactions tend to provide incentives for patient sellers to be more truthful but for higher-quality sellers to be less truthful.