Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Model-based analysis of configuration vulnerabilities
Journal of Computer Security
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Policy management using access control spaces
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient Minimum-Cost Network Hardening Via Exploit Dependency Graphs
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
The Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle
ACSAC '04 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Verifying information flow goals in security-enhanced Linux
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'03
NETRA:: seeing through access control
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
A scalable approach to attack graph generation
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Analyzing integrity protection in the SELinux example policy
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
MulVAL: a logic-based network security analyzer
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
A logical specification and analysis for SELinux MLS policy
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Expandable grids for visualizing and authoring computer security policies
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
EON: modeling and analyzing dynamic access control systems with logic programs
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A user study of the expandable grid applied to P3P privacy policy visualization
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Modeling the trust boundaries created by securable objects
WOOT'08 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on USENIX Workshop on offensive technologies
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An operating system relies heavily on its access control mechanisms to defend against local and remote attacks. The complexities of modern access control mechanisms and the scale of possible configurations are often overwhelming to system administrators and software developers. Therefore mis-configurations are very common and the security consequences are serious. Given the popularity and uniqueness of Microsoft Windows systems, it is critical to have a tool to comprehensively examine the access control configurations. However, current studies on Windows access control mechanisms are mostly based on known attack patterns. We propose a tool, WACCA, to systematically analyze the Windows configurations. Given the attacker's initial abilities and goals, WACCA generates an attack graph based on interaction rules. The tool then automatically generates attack patterns from the attack graph. Each attack pattern represents attacks of the same nature. The attack subgraphs and instances are also generated for each pattern. Compared to existing solutions, WACCA is more comprehensive and does not rely on manually defined attack patterns. It also has a unique feature in that it models software vulnerabilities and therefore can find attacks that rely on exploiting these vulnerabilities. We study two attack cases on a Windows Vista host and discuss the analysis results.