Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Mathematical Aspects of Mixing Times in Markov Chains (Foundations and Trends(R) in Theoretical Computer Science)
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
An architectural view of game theoretic control
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Optimal gateway selection in multi-domain wireless networks: a potential game perspective
MobiCom '11 Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Spatial spectrum access game: nash equilibria and distributed learning
Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM international symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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Game theoretic modeling and equilibrium analysis of congestion games have provided insights in the performance of Internet congestion control, road transportation networks, etc. Despite the long history, very little is known about their transient (non equilibrium) performance. In this paper, we are motivated to seek answers to questions such as how long does it take to reach equilibrium, when the system does operate near equilibrium in the presence of dynamics, e.g. nodes join or leave. , or the tradeoff between performance and the rate of dynamics. In this pursuit, we provide three contributions in this paper. First, a novel probabilistic model to capture realistic behaviors of agents allowing for the possibility of arbitrariness in conjunction with rationality. Second, evaluation of (a) time to converge to equilibrium under this behavior model and (b) distance to Nash equilibrium. Finally, determination of tradeoff between the rate of dynamics and quality of performance (distance to equilibrium) which leads to an interesting uncertainty principle. The novel technical ingredients involve analysis of logarithmic Sobolov constant of Markov process with time varying state space and methodically this should be of broader interest in the context of dynamical systems.