An auction-based incentive mechanism for non-altruistic cooperative ARQ via spectrum-leasing

Authors:
Igor Stanojev;Osvaldo Simeone;Umberto Spagnolini;Yeheskel Bar-Ness;Raymond L. Pickholtz
Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy and CWCSPR, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey;CWCSPR, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey;Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy;Department of Electrical Engineering, The George Washington University, Washington D.C.;Department of Electrical Engineering, The George Washington University, Washington D.C.
Venue:
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Year:
2009

Citing 7
Cited 1

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Analysis and design of cognitive radio networks and distributed radio resource management algorithms
Cooperative ARQ via auction-based spectrum leasing

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Abstract

We propose and analyze a novel decentralized mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative stations to participate as relays in cooperative ARQ protocol. Cooperation incentive is provided by the possibility for the source to lease a portion of retransmission slot for the traffic of relaying terminals. To further leverage the opportunistic nature of cooperative ARQ and obtain a fully decentralized solution, the (motivated) relaying nodes compete for access to the retransmission slot by trying to make the best retransmission offer. Effective arbitration of cooperative retransmissions is performed using auction theory (bidding), with the source in the role of the auctioneer, the relaying nodes acting as the bidders and the (use of the) retransmission slot as the bidding article. It is noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights model (spectrum leasing). Numerical results and analysis confirm the efficient dynamic resource allocation property of the proposed scheme, revealing the relevant gains in terms of expected number of (re)transmissions required for successful data delivery for both the source (primary) and the cooperating (secondary) nodes.