Towards an accurate AS-level traceroute tool
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Listen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Understanding Resiliency of Internet Topology against Prefix Hijack Attacks
DSN '07 Proceedings of the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Prefix Hijacking
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PHAS: a prefix hijack alert system
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A light-weight distributed scheme for detecting ip prefix hijacks in real-time
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes
ICNP '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Ispy: detecting ip prefix hijacking on my own
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
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In prefix hijacking, an Autonomous System (AS) advertises routes for prefixes that are owned by another AS, and ends up hijacking traffic that is intended to the owner. While misconfigurations and/or misunderstandings of policies are the likely reasons behind the majority of those incidents, malicious incidents have also been reported. Recent works have focused on malicious scenarios that aim to maximize the amount of hijacked traffic from all ASes, without considering scenarios where the attacker is aiming to avoid detection. In this paper, we expose a new class of prefix hijacking that is stealthy in nature. The idea is to craft path(s) - of tunable lengths - that deceive only a small subset of ASes. By finely tuning the degree to which ASes are effected, the attacker can handle the hijacked traffic while the victimized AS would not observe a major reduction in its incoming traffic that would raise an alarm. We give upper bounds on the impact of those attacks via simulations on real BGP Internet announcements obtained from Route-Views. We discuss shortcomings in current proposed defense mechanisms against attackers which can falsify traceroute replies. We also present a defense mechanism against stealthy prefix hijacking attacks.