Uniform Leader Election Protocols for Radio Networks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Elections in a Distributed Computing System
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Bio inspired models of network, information and computing systems
A game-theoretic analysis of wireless access point selection by mobile users
Computer Communications
A Self-Stabilizing Leader Election Algorithm in Highly Dynamic Ad Hoc Mobile Networks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Election games for resource allocation in multicarrier multiuser wireless networks
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
User Selection With Zero-Forcing Beamforming Achieves the Asymptotically Optimal Sum Rate
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing - Part I
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications - Part 2
Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Efficiency of Market-Based Resource Allocation among Many Participants
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Competition and equilibrium in multiuser networks with multiple service providers
Asilomar'09 Proceedings of the 43rd Asilomar conference on Signals, systems and computers
Election games for resource allocation in multicarrier multiuser wireless networks
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
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This paper investigates the issue of resource allocation in heterogenous wireless networks, where users have a choice between multiple service providers. We investigate the feasibility of modeling the allocation problem as a probabilistic voting game. In other words, competing transmitters are modeled as candidates in an election, while the receivers form the electorate. Two specific examples are analyzed in this work: a MIMO downlink power allocation game, and an OFDM-based bandwidth allocation game. The robustness and existence of equilibrium outcomes of the proposed voting games are studied in detail. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify the performance of the proposed voting-theoretic algorithms.