Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A bandwidth sharing approach to improve licensed spectrum utilization
IEEE Communications Magazine
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Decentralized cognitive MAC for opportunistic spectrum access in ad hoc networks: A POMDP framework
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper, we model and analyze the interactions between secondary users in a spectrum overlay cognitive system as a cognitive MAC game. In this game, each secondary user can sense (and transmit) one of several channels, the availability of each channel is determined by the activity of the corresponding primary user. We show that this game belongs to the class of congestion game and thus there exists at least one Nash Equilibrium. We focus on analyzing the worst case efficiency loss (i.e., price of anarchy) at any Nash Equilibrium of such a game. Closed-form expressions of price of anarchy are derived for both symmetric and asymmetric games, with arbitrary channel and user heterogeneity. Several insights are also derived in terms of how to design better cognitive radio systems with less severe efficiency loss.